Mature Systems in Global Markets: The Need for an Institutional Division of Labour by Federico Frattini
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI FERRARA
DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMI A ISTITUZION I TERRITORIO






Mature Systems in Global Markets:
The Need for an Institutional Division of Labour
                  
   
               Federico Frattini
 






Editor:      Leonzio Rizzo (leonzio.rizzo@unife.it) 
Managing Editor:   Patrizia Fordiani (patrizia.fordiani@unife.it) 
Editorial Board:   Francesco Badia  
   Enrico Deidda Gagliardo 
Roberto Ghiselli Ricci 
   Simonetta Renga 
http://www.unife.it/dipartimento/economia/pubblicazioni/quaderni-del-
dipartimento/ Mature Systems in Global Markets:  
The Need for an Institutional Division of Labour* 
Federico Frattini** 
University of Ferrara 
Abstract 
This paper approaches innovation as a need and not as a choice, particularly in the 
case of mature systems, defined as localized systems of production that are deeply 
specialised in mature industries. Their only strategy to achieve competitiveness is 
an innovation-driven shake-out combining new technological patterns with the ex-
isting resources and involving local institutions in production in order to avoid an 
unbearable shock. The Italian case is useful to introduce the idea of an institutional 
division of labour limited by the extent of the market and the institutional coher-
ence of the system. According to this approach, the innovation policy has also a po-
litical dimension, which development and competition possibilities depend on.  
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1. Introduction 
The innovation is one of the most relevant elements in competition nowadays. 
Generally innovation is considered as a possible strategy followed by entrepreneurs 
according to their businesses or by research institutions and governments according 
to social goals. Instead, this paper approaches innovation as a need and not as a 
choice, particularly in the case of mature systems, defined as localized systems of 
production that are deeply specialised in mature industries. According to that, the 
aim here is to demonstrate that innovation activities have to be structurally includ-
ed in the production organization with a renewed involvement of institutions. In or-
der to do this, the attention will be mainly focused on the Italian case. Other than 
my direct experience about it, the Italian manufacturing system presents some rel-
evant elements outlined in Section 2.  
Firstly, just like Germany and Japan, Italy has played a central role in the se-
cond industrial divide (Piore & Sabel, 1984) due to the crisis of the Fordism in the 
70s.  Hence,  it  is  particularly  interesting  to  analyse  the  conditions  for  a  radical 
change in the organization of production in a framework already experienced by the 
successful case of the industrial districts. Secondly, this specific way of organizing 
production mainly concerns traditional industries of manufacturing (Geografie del 
nuovo Made in Italy, 2009; Dei Ottati, 2004; Bianchi & Labory, 2011; Bianchi, 2002), 
mostly in the maturity stage. In such a context, it becomes very difficult to face new 
competitors from emerging countries and the troubles of a knowledge-based econo-
my (Foray & Lundvall, 1996). Lastly, those industries are characterized by high 
sunk costs both economic and social due to their specialisations (Marshall, 1890; 
Marshall & Marshall, 1879). That embedding generally prevents the possibility of 
exit or industrial conversion, thus the only strategy is an innovation-driven shake-
out, going through a formalised participation of institutions in production.  
Section 3 focuses on the phenomena of globalisation and international crisis 
not in order to individuate competition criticism, but rather some elements useful to 
a renewed organisation of production. On one side, globalisation represents an ex-
ceptional increase in the extent of the market providing the opportunity for a radi-
cal change in the organisation of labour (Bianchi & Labory, 2011) and, according to 
Adam Smith, for relevant improvements in the ways of production that could be 
generally considered as innovation. On the other side, the current crisis has sug-
gested the need for a change in creating more relevant investment opportunities in 
production (Bianchi & Pozzi, 2010a).   2 
Section 4 concerns the possibilities to increase the competitiveness of mature 
industries,  considering  both  the  need  for  shifting  them  to  the  knowledge-based 
economy and a renewed involvement of institutions. More precisely, it is not only 
the recognition about the central role of institutions in innovation systems (Cooke, 
Heidenreich,  &  Braczyk,  2004;  Etzkowitz  &  Leydesdorff,  2000;  Freeman,  2008; 
Lundvall,  2010;  Malerba,  2004a;  Nelson,  1993;  Poma,  2003),  but  the  suggestion 
here is to look at institutions in a wide sense (Nelson & Sampat, 2001) and to or-
ganise manufacturing activities depending on an institutional division of labour. 
Finally, Section 5 describes an approach to innovation policy consistent with 
this concept of institutional involvement and that is, for this reason, also political. 
In such a context, innovation policy is mainly institutional change, which consists 
in the allocation of new production capabilities enabling the participation of institu-
tions to the production process. 
2. From industries to mature systems: the Italian case 
As described by Patrizio Bianchi (2002), during the second half of 70s the Ital-
ian manufacturing system responded to the oil crises with a deep reorganisation 
that has not appeared as not the large firm disintegration, but rather as the decon-
struction of the whole industrial system in small enterprises joining other ones al-
ready producing differentiated goods in specialised niches. Nonetheless, SMEs have 
become the entrepreneurial leading model characterised by a development often in-
dependent from the large enterprises that at same time were facing their own in-
ternal reorganisation at that time. 
Therefore, SMEs has been able to keep the employment growth (Bianchi, 2002). 
This phenomenon has been possible because of the organisation of SMEs in inte-
grated  and  localised  entrepreneurial  systems  competing  with  large  enterprises 
(Marshall & Marshall, 1879; Marshall, 1890). This has been the renaissance of the 
industrial districts, characterised by a high density of small and specialised enter-
prises in a bound space. The “industrial atmosphere” created by that concentration 
(Marshall & Marshall, 1879) has provided to SMEs their competitive advantage, 
but in the Italian case it has achieved such a deep economic and social embedding 
(Poma, 2003) to make the industrial districts substitute industries in the industrial 
organisation research (Becattini, 1979). The territorial dimension is fundamental. 
Competition and cooperation coexist within the district boundaries (Becattini, 
1979; Poma, 2003), due to the division of labour generally organised over some lead-  3 
ing enterprises and a network of several contractors (Bianchi, 2002). The fault of 
this spontaneous, but fragile equilibrium is to delay or to stop some typical process-
es of industrial development, such as the dynamics related to the response to exter-
nal spurs, the growth of the firms, the technological evolution of specialisations and 
the entry-exit mechanisms (Poma, 2003). 
The main industries in Italian manufacturing are foods and beverages, textiles 
and fashion, furniture, and automation (Geografie del nuovo Made in Italy, 2009). 
During the last three decades they have been able to increase their exports and 
added value creating the phenomenon known as “Made in Italy”. Nonetheless, only 
automation has partially experienced a renewing path (Freddi, 2009; ANTARES, 
2004), whereas the other ones have continued to operate within the same technolog-
ical pattern and the same industrial life cycles. Hence, Italian industrial districts 
have come to face the maturity of their referential markets and, as a consequence, 
they can be intended as mature systems.  
Actually, a mature market is characterised by a slowing output growth, the 
decline in entry, and the stabilisation of market shares. In such a situation competi-
tion shifts to price (Klepper, 1997). Thus, the attention is paid more to the process 
than to the product with a consequent growth of investments in capital-intensive 
methods. This behaviour couples with the need for gaining additional economies of 
scale and increasing the minimum efficient size and it leads to a reduction in the 
number of competitors (Klepper, 1996). Figure 1 shows data about the number of 
enterprises in the main Italian industrial specialisations and suggests that a ma-
ture stage is at least the case of textiles and fashion (wearing apparel and dressing), 
furniture, and automation (machinery and equipment). 
















Figure 1. Number of enterprises in the main Italian industries.  
Years: 2001-2007, 2001=100. Source: Elaboration on Eurostat data   4 
crete, because the decrease in the number of enterprises and the adoption of labour-
saving techniques probably generate a strong decline in employment and the over-
lap between the industrial and the territorial dimension causes dramatic problems 
of social sustainability and the loss of a relevant amount of high-specialised physi-
cal, human and knowledge capital. The result is weakened possibilities of industrial 
recovery. Therefore, in the case of mature systems the only strategy to achieve com-
petitiveness is a shake-out that combines new technological patterns with the exist-
ing resource endowments in order to avoid an unbearable shock. 
3. The impact of globalisation and international crisis 
The suggested sort of shake-out has as its main feature the definition of a new 
industrial trajectory and, as a consequence, the reorganisation of the relations of 
production. But in the case of mature systems this is also the reorganisation of so-
cial relations. Thus, the stakeout is a radical change so risky that compels both the 
enterprises and the social basis to cope with a structural uncertainty and the need 
for a really attractive set of conditions and incentives to change (Poma, 2003). 
Nowadays, the conditions are provided by globalisation, because «globalisation 
has dramatically increased the extent of the market» (Bianchi & Labory, 2011, p. 
41). According to Adam Smith (1776), this phenomenon provides the possibilities to 
improve the division of labour that is just a reorganisation of the production rela-
tions and a redefinition of the industrial specialisations. Hence, mature systems 
have  mainly  to  look  at  globalisation  as  the  binding  framework  more  for  self-
responding to the need of radical change, than for facing aggressive competitors. 
In the same way, from an industrial point of view international crisis currently 
provides the incentive to change. As suggested by George J. Stigler (1951), speciali-
sations are achieved according to long cyclical fluctuations (Schumpeter J. A., 1939) 
and the lock-in by historical events (Arthur, 1989). Generally a crisis breaks such 
lock-in configurations leading to redefine the set of relations within the production 
processes. However, those relations continue to operate beside the same technologi-
cal pattern without any change in industrial specialisations. Such a transformation 
is provided only by a structural crisis stating the end of a long wave and the start of 
a new one (Bianchi & Labory, 2011; Bianchi & Pozzi, 2010a; Perez, 2008).  
This sort of crisis is mainly characterised by a progressive shift of financial re-
sources from production activities to more profitable speculations creating a «gap 
between the financial and the productive spheres of economy» (Bianchi & Labory,   5 
2011, p. 33). Thus, the possibilities to achieve new degrees of specialisation couple 
with the need for providing more attractive investment opportunities and these cor-
respond to the offer of expected profits and market power. The only element able to 
provide them is innovation (Schumpeter J. A., 1939; Schumpeter J. A., 1942) and 
this is the reason why the mature systems shake-out has to be innovation-driven. 
Even so, similarly to other knowledge-based activities, innovation has no pre-
dictable  outcomes  and  often  it  is  not  possible  to  efficiently  organise  it  (Nonaka, 
1994),  but  such  issues  can  be  partially  at  least  managed  at  the  moment  of  the 
shake-out. In fact, other than the nature of the product, the efficiency of a produc-
tion  process  depends  on  the  degree  of  specialisation  in  the  different  phases  and 
functions (Stigler, 1951), but not always an optimal one is achievable within the 
firm or among several firms due to matters of size, sunkness, risk, and so on. For 
this reason, the shake-out has to increase the extent of the division of labour, loos-
ening its boundaries and allowing someone else never involved before to participate. 
Hoever, to really improve the outcome of the system shake-out, also new par-
ticipants have to be locally embedded in such a way. Thus, an innovation-driven 
shake-out of mature systems needs to involve local institutions. In this way, produc-
tion and competition stop to be only entrepreneurial matters and achieve a territo-
rial dimension (Poma, 2003). Hence, given the industrial specialisation, the econom-
ical and social constraints, and the set of conditions and incentives provided by the 
globalisation and the international crisis, an innovation-driven shake-out involving 
the local institutions is, on one side, the only industrial strategy for mature systems 
to  gain  competitiveness  and,  on  the  other  one,  the  most  radical  transformation 
bearable by the system. 
4. An institutional division of labour for competing 
The relevance of institutions in the dynamics of innovation systems is widely 
recognised by the institutional-evolutionary paradigm, mainly defining the context 
for innovation activities, governing them, providing the most part of new knowledge 
through universities and other public research centres and allowing all players in-
volved to share this knowledge (Cooke, Heidenreich, & Braczyk, 2004; Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Lundvall, 2010; Malerba, 2004a; Nelson, 1993). 
Institutions are “systems of established and embedded social rules that struc-
ture social interaction” (Hodgson, 2006, p. 18). Next to them, there are more general 
social structures and rules, conventions and habits that emerge as relevant factors   6 
inducing routines in economic processes (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Of course these 
routines  have  some  productive  and  competitive  rationale,  nevertheless  time  and 
space localisation of the production activities are relevant too. In fact, because of 
their social dimension, institutions are historically shaped (Leydesdorff, 2006) and 
historically shape the way to organise the production.  
Hence, institutions are factors bearing on economic performance and in this 
way they can be considered more generally as “standardized social technologies” 
(Nelson & Sampat, 2001, p. 44). All the institutions play a role in economic process-
es, although acting in several ways related to their nature. For this reason, there 
are various taxonomies about institutions in literature as that provided by Goeffry 
M. Hodgson (2006), even so the relvant distinction here is the one between institu-
tions as shared rules and beliefs and institutions as organisations and authorities.  
According with Richard R. Nelson and Bhaven N. Sampat (2001), the first ones 
can be strictly named as the “standardized social technologies”, each one with its 
own implicit function. Generally, in Western Countries they are the result of long 
paths in which values, interests and feelings have been overlapped building the 
whole set-up of societies (Rawls, 2001). Nonetheless they affect directly the organi-
sation of production. The most famous case is the influence of the Protestant ethics 
on the development of capitalism analysed by Max Weber (1905).  
Instead, the second kind includes structured groups of people able to make a 
choice in shaping the economic processes. This is the reason why these kind of insti-
tutions are submitted to continuous, more or less direct, and democratic on purpose 
mechanisms of turn-over. They are authorities if their mission is to conserve public 
interests and organisations if they take care of collective, but partial ones. Because 
of their possibility of making choices and taking decisions, authorities and organisa-
tions can be defined as active institutions. 
Both these kinds of institutions are in such a way something laying upon so-
cial relations, and upon the economic ones among them. Thus, according to Karl 
Marx (1859) institutions could be intended as super-structures, but this idea run 
the risk to consider institutions mainly as a burden. Instead, I suggest looking at 
institutions as infra-structures, i.e. something staying among the relations of pro-
duction, although preserving their political nature. 
This perspective has three main implications. The first and more articulated 
one concerns the approach to existent institutions. On one side, they do not repre-
sent only a cost for democracy. In fact, it has been demonstrated that, at certain 
conditions, there could be an advantage in organising relations beyond the path of 
the economy (Coase R. H., 1937; Williamson, 1996). On the other one, institutions   7 
often  mark  a  distinction  between  industrialising  and  industrialised  countries 
(Chang, 2003). Nevertheless they are not an element of dominance or superiority, 
but rather an additional resource at the disposal in the production processes.  
Both social technologies and active institutions provide an “institutional at-
mosphere”  shaping  the  production  possibilities  (Poma,  2003).  Nonetheless,  social 
technologies in such a way represent the basic tools and facilities available in pro-
duction organisation, whereas active institutions are at least potential players in 
the production processes. As a consequence, they can be involved in the division of 
labour that in this way becomes an institutional division of labour. 
In an innovation perspective, there are several groups of active institutions 
that should take a part in the production processes. Sketching out a framework 
based on the Italian experience, among authorities there are mainly the local ad-
ministrations and the development agencies. Furthermore, universities and cham-
bers of commerce like local autonomous departments of the national government 
can be considered as close to them. Organisations rather include the institutional-
ised shareholders, i.e. unions, entrepreneurial and professional associations, trusts 
and credit institutions. But the institutional division of labour is not the hypothesis 
of «more ore less institutionalised “negotiations” between multiple self-interested 
groups of actors» (Kuhlmann, 2001, p. 961). Each one of the active institutions pro-
duces some positive externalities in pursuing its mission. Accepting the institution-
al division of labour approach means turn these contributions into a recognised, 
structuralised and formalised set of productive actions. According to Patrizio Bian-
chi and Sandrine Labory (2011), firms have to “unbundle” the production processes 
and to let the active institutions get in the supply chain. Thus, positive externalities 
turn into externalised phases of production taking directly part to the division of la-
bour.  
The second implication concerns the relation between economy and policy. De-
spite of the neoclassical paradigm and the hypothesis about an auctioneer (Walras, 
1874), the suggested approach is based on the belief of the dominance of policy. The 
considerations about the social and political aspects of institutions lead to claim 
that there is not any natural order related to the structure and functioning of insti-
tutions. They are at least the indirect outcomes of political processes. In other words, 
institutions  as  fundamental  synthesis  of  social  relations  strictly  depend  on  «the 
stakeholders’ desirability of the outcomes» (Bianchi & Pozzi, 2010a, p. 43). In the 
same  way,  also  the  evolutionary  idea  inspired  by  Hayek  (1937)  about  self-
organising  systems  (Nelson  &  Winter,  1982;  Etzkowitz  &  Leydesdorff,  2000; 
Leydesdorff, 2006) risk to fall in trouble without admitting a role for collective will-  8 
ingness  and  responsibility  in  choosing  possibilities  and  limits  of  the  structural 
change formalisation. 
The final implication concerns the relations between institutions inside local 
systems. It is well known that industrial policy requires the coherence among the 
policy  actions  or  more  generally  the  routes  of  interventions  (Bianchi  &  Labory, 
2011). Nonetheless, the suggested approach needs something more. Referring to the 
institutional division of labour, it could be said that «the extent of this division must 
always be limited […] by the extent of the market» (Smith, 1776) and the institu-
tional coherence of the system of production. In fact, without any consistency in in-
stitutional structure, functions and tasks, there is no real possibility for a local sys-
tem to be effective. The most part of this coherence arises from “lock-in” mecha-
nisms making the institutions coevolve beside a trajectory (Leydesdorff, 2006) and 
the institutional division of labour really feasible. 
5. A political approach to innovation policy 
The goal of innovation policy here is the industrial shake-out of mature sys-
tems through the institutional division of labour. The direct involvement of institu-
tions as part of the supply chain is a crucial element in order to preserve the indus-
trial  specialisation  of  a  system  as  a  whole,  including  physical,  human  and 
knowledge capital. Despite of that, introducing an institutional division of labour in 
mature systems is a deep but bearable change in the social and economic relations 
inside the system. As a consequence, the innovation policy outcome represents itself 
a sort of Schumpeterian innovation, a structural transformation without any incon-
sistent break with the past (Schumpeter J. A., 1942).  
Hence,  in  this  approach  innovation  policy  needs  first  of  all  a  large  social 
agreement  about  the  shake-out  trajectory  and  a  shared  willingness  to  change 
among the active institutions. Nonetheless, these ones are not pure political aspects 
behind innovation policy, but they define the boundaries of possibilities and capabil-
ities in the industrial development. On one side, starting from the pre-existing capi-
tal endowment, the trajectory of the shake-out designs the set of technological plat-
forms  adoptable  inside  a  mature  system.  On  the  other  one,  the  willingness  to 
change sets the divisibility of labour among active institutions, that determines the 
depth of their potential specialisation and, as a consequence, the effectiveness of the 
achievable lock-in configurations (Arthur, 1989). Each deviation or free-riding be-  9 
haviour among active institutions could tighten the evolution boundaries (Olson, 
1965) and compromise the effectiveness of the development path.  
Thus, the political dimension of the innovation policy turns into the industrial 
one, shaping its effects because of the dynamic nature of specialisation. Depending 
on the variety of specialisations, technological possibilities represent the opportuni-
ties of entry, i.e. the potential occasions to face a new market. Instead, depending 
on the intensity of specialisations, the institutional divisibility of labour sets the po-
tential efficiency and competitiveness of the supply chain, i.e. the capabilities to 
stay in a market. In addition, the political dimension affects the period to realise 
both industrial possibilities and capabilities, period that is related to the effective-
ness of political processes inside the system. As a consequence, the faster is the 
overlap, the earlier a lock-in configuration could be managed, i.e. a potential market 
power is provided. According to that, the institutional coherence of the system has 
not only a static relevance, but also a dynamic one. 
Nonetheless, the dynamic effect of the institutional coherence does not end in-
side the system, but it provides the credibility of the innovation policy too. Just the 
credibility is the element turning the system possibilities and capabilities of com-
peting into actual competitiveness. Because the industrial shake-out gives to com-
petition a territorial dimension, capturing external provisions is the main route to 
expand and to improve competitiveness (Poma, 2003). The amount of captured pro-
visions shapes the constraints in choosing how many and which technological plat-
forms to get effective among the possible ones, i.e. in the long term that amount de-
termines the intensity and the quality of the industrial development trough the se-
lection of the system lock-in configurations. 
Anyway, the relation between the political dimension of the innovation policy 
and the industrial one is not direct and goes trough an intermediate level of change 
made by two different layouts (Figure 2). The first one is organisational and con-
Figure 2. Dimensions of the institutional division of labour.   10 
cerns the assignment of some phases of the production process to the active institu-
tions. Of course, each active institution has its own vocation to undertake one or 
more roles within the institutional division of labour. The phases have to be select-
ed considering their compatibility with the several institutional missions and func-
tions.  
The  best-known  example  is  the  third  mission  of  universities  (Etzkowitz  & 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Poma & Ramaciotti, 2008; Poma & Ramaciotti, 2010). Pursuing 
its  own  mission,  university  already  carries  out  two  functions  relevant  for  the 
knowledge production, i.e. education and scientific research, but without any con-
straint to such a relation with the development path of the system, that is only a 
possibility.  
In Italy, a little improvement is represented by introducing the opportunity 
successfully  experienced  aboard  to  join  the  two  historical  missions  of  the  Hum-
boldtian university with a third one, in order to encourage technology transfer by 
the creation of liaison offices and the promotion of spin-off activities (Poma & Ra-
maciotti, 2008; Poma & Ramaciotti, 2010). Adding this new function has undoubt-
edly induced university to pay more attention to the industrial issues, but it is not 
still enough according to an approach based on the institutional division of labour. 
Actually, university continues to lack of the involvement in the development paths, 
particularly concerning its trajectories. Only by recognising these trajectories and 
contributing in their definition, university can take part in the institutional division 
of labour. Moreover, it is in recognising and participating to the system develop-
ment that university demonstrates its willingness of participation and, thus, of spe-
cialisation. 
Although  it  could  seem  that  the  admittance  of  a  change  depends  just  on 
providing appropriate incentives, but this is not true. Like in every process of insti-
tutional evolution, also in the university case a resilience to change could emerge 
(Poma, 2003). Just in order to avoid resilience to delay or stop the evolution process, 
the political dimension has weight. Therefore, if university actually participates in 
the institutional division of labour, it is obvious that its own tasks would not be only 
to provide applied research directly manageable into the production process, but al-
so to redirect both the educational and scientific research functions according to the 
perspectives established by the development trajectories. 
If there has already been a debate about the role of university in the new com-
petition framework, more difficult is the argumentation about the other active insti-
tutions, especially organisations. Because of their original missions, unions and as-
sociations should have first of all the capabilities to deal with the organisational is-  11 
sues, particularly in setting up the production according the new trajectory and to 
define the need for physical, human and knowledge capital in the industrial shake-
out and during the following development path. Instead, trusts and credit institu-
tions have an important role in setting up mechanisms useful to satisfy this need 
and  make  other  functions  to  be  effective.  In  such  a  way,  they  have  a  bottom-
coordination responsibility. 
The last group of active institutions are the local authorities. Because they are 
entitled to seal the development, they are empowered of an up-coordination role. 
Although this is an advantaged condition, local authorities have to assume such a 
new functions, formally separating the externalities provided to the system from 
the activities closely related to the government action, as in the case of development 
promotion agencies. This functional spin-off process is an entitling one by which not 
only local authorities, but also the other active institutions gain the capability to 
participate in the institutional division of labour. Hence, the mechanism to get in-
stitutions to access to production is the building of a market relation system that, as 
in the bargaining case (Coase R. H., 1937; Coase R. H., 1960), are aimed to provide 
the need entitlements for the allocation of production capabilities.  
Nonetheless, some problems could arise. One is related to the possibilities of 
coordination among several authorities governing at different territorial levels on 
the same localised system. Another one concerns the set of regulatory tools at the 
disposal. In fact, there is the possibility that the industrial shake-out of the system 
would  partially  depend  on  the  regulatory  intervention  by  high-level  institutions 
that are not embedded in the evolution process and, as a consequence, also excluded 
from a political point of view. 
The second layout is actually the regulatory one. The organisational layout de-
fines by itself a set of functions opening the supply chain to the active institutions, 
but the change is not completed and, even, it could be self-defeating for the devel-
opment path without to have been finalised. In fact, the assignment of new func-
tions to the active institutions forces to introduce regulatory reforms making the in-
stitutional structure to couple both with the historical and the assigned missions. 
Otherwise, the industrial shake-out could run into two kinds of problems.  
Firstly, an efficiency loss could arise in following the industrial trajectories, 
due to a «bifurcation process within an evolving system» (Leydesdorff, 2006, p. 197). 
Bifurcation is not per se a trouble affecting the system evolution and it rather is the 
phenomenon providing middle term adjustments in response to the less long waves. 
Nonetheless, the second and really destructive problem for the development paths 
and the shake-out-invested resources could be caused by bifurcation, if it would be a   12 
structural process. In this case, the institutional coherence would be compromised 
and there would be no political sustainability both internal and external. 
Therefore, the regulatory layout is not an issue less relevant than the other 
one. According to this approach regulation is not only the act of formalising the in-
stitutional division of labour, but also the way to gain the institutional coherence 
and to realise the institutional division of labour in order to cope with the extent of 
the market. 
6. Conclusions  
This paper is inspired by the Italian experience, as introduced. In Italy the in-
dustrial system in mainly characterized by a large number of SMEs deeply special-
ised in mature industries as heritage of the successful experience of the industrial 
districts. Nowadays, these industries are the most in trouble in the international 
competition framework shaped by globalisation and the international crisis. Diffi-
culties mainly arise from some structural elements as the sunkness of social and 
economic embedding and the consequent limitation in the openness to new oppor-
tunities. Even so, in Italy there are also some relevant behavioural matters linked 
to the structural ones, such as the lack of investment opportunities (Bianchi & La-
bory, 2011) and the low intensity of the R&D system (Malerba, 1993), as well as pol-
icy-related matters, like the impoverishment of the educational system. All of these 
could seriously lead the industrial system to lock-in in not desirable configurations. 
Although this is the national trend, some interesting and effective practices 
has been implemented. The Regional Programme for Industrial Research, Innova-
tion, and Technology Transfer (PRRIITT) (Poma & Ramaciotti, 2008; Poma & Ra-
maciotti,  2010)  and  the  in-progress  reform  of  the  educational-training  system  in 
Emilia-Romagna are some of those. Testing the suggested approach in comparison 
with the result of these policies will certainly be stimulating to continue the reason-
ing about the institutional division of labour.  
Therefore, the Italian case has been useful to introduce the idea of an institu-
tional division of labour and to provide a political approach to innovation policy. 
Nonetheless, I believe that this approach could be generalized in order to provide a 
useful tool for interpreting the organisation of the innovation systems and the poli-
cies for innovation also in better performing situations. An institutional division of 
labour is anyway consistent with the fact that «there is increasing elaborate divi-
sion of labour in the generation of knowledge» (Metcalfe, 2005, p. 53).   13 
Knowledge has always been a basic element in production as noted by Adam 
Smith (1776), but nowadays it has even extended to shaping structurally the com-
petition framework. The institutional division of labour is based on the main as-
sumption  that  institutional  activities  concern  not  only  government  (Etzkowitz  & 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Leydesdorff, 2006; Poma, 2003), but they also represent produc-
tion capabilities. Thus, production has an economic, a social and a political dimen-
sion. The last one is not intended as determination external and super-ordinated 
compared with production, but as the collective choice related to a collective and 
overall effort aimed to the change. 
Indeed, the involvement of institutions in this process, and more precisely the 
active institutions, leads to a sort of division of labour limited by the extent of the 
market and by the institutional coherence within the system. This coherence has 
two meanings: from the internal point of view, it is the condition for the evolution 
process to be effective and to give the system a market positioning; from the exter-
nal one, it is the condition to do not waste the heritage employed in the change and 
to make an industrial development route to be really feasible. Both these conditions 
depend on a regulatory layout, able to lock-in the whole system in a configuration 
consistent with the depth of the change and the real access to the supply chain by 
the active institutions. 
In this way, the institutional coherence is related to the institutional agree-
ment and willingness to change strongly constraining the organisational layout of 
the system. On one side, the agreement among institutions and, trough democratic 
processes, within the whole system designs the nature and the variety of specialisa-
tion resulting from the industrial shake-out. On the other one, the willingness of 
each active institution to participate in the division of labour defines the potential 
level of specialisation.  
In order to put into action these agreement and willingness, active institutions 
have to be entitled of specific functions separated from their original tasks. Like 
with the third mission of university, the spin-off of what is considered a positive ex-
ternality is the solution that should be provided by the regulatory layout. Hence, 
the institutional participation to the production process depends on building a set of 
new market relations within the system in order to allocate new production capabil-
ities. The innovation policy is the set of tools providing this institutional change.   14 
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